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PATRONAGE DIVIDENDS: INCOME DISTRIBUTION
OR PRICE ADJUSTMENT
ALBERT W. ADcocK*
One of the most controversial issues before the public today concerns the appli-
cation of the federal income tax to cooperative corporations. In full-page newspaper
advertisements, radio round-table discussions, magazine articles, and newspaper
editorials are found discussions of this subject. It is on the agenda of the House
Committee on Small Business, which is interested in the question whether co-
operative corporations have any unfair competitive advantages over private corpora-
tions. It is on the agenda of the House Ways and Means Committee, which is
interested in the income of cooperative corporations as a possible source of additional
revenue.
A cooperative corporation does not pay the same income taxes that a private
corporation doing a similar amount of business with the same efficiency pays. The
reason for this difference is the subject of the present controversy.
Cooperative leaders maintain that they merely adjust their prices at the end of
the year, with the result that their business is done at cost. Private business, on the
other hand, maintains that cooperatives do business at a profit and then, in ac-
cordance with their by-laws, distribute this corporate profit to their patrons on the
basis of their patronage.
A corporation doing business at cost has no income. Therefore, if the coopera-
tives are correct in their contentions, no one can rightfully complain if they pay
no income taxes. If, however, cooperative corporations are distributing net incbme
instead of adjusting prices when they pay their patronage dividends, there is a
grave injustice in the present tax treatment of the patronage dividends of coopera-
tive corporations.
I
Some cooperative corporations are organized under the business corporation acts
of the various states. Since they earn their profits in the same manner as any other
business corporation, no special knowledge as to the nature of their profits when
they are distributed as patronage dividends can be obtained from studying the laws
under which they are incorporated.
The same is not true with respect to cooperatives which are organized under the
cooperative laws of their respective states. These corporations must operate within
the framework of the laws under which they are organized, and much light can
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be thrown on this controversy by a study of the laws to see whether such corpora-
tions do bfisiness on a cost basis or whether they earn profits which they distribute
to their stockholder-patrons in the form of dividends on stock and on patronage.
A better understanding of the nature of the patronage dividend will be ob-
tained if the cooperative financial statement is first examined. Although the termi-
nology may be different from that used by ordinary corporations, the steps taken
are identical.
From gross receipts the cooperative corporation deducts the cost of goods sold
and necessary operating expenses. The result, with a few adjustments, is the
corporate net profits, which the cooperative sometimes labels net margins, net sav-
ings, net over-deposits, etc. A part of these net profits (or net savings, as co-
operatives often call them) is usually put into surplus, and another part is often
credited to an educational fund. The remainder of the net profits is distributed
to the corporation's group of stockholder-patrons in the form of dividends on capital
and on patronage.
The laws under which cooperative corporations are organized and the by-laws
of most such corporations customarily recognize that these corporations make
profits, and that out of such profits dividends on capital stock may be paid. The
remaining profits, if any, are then available for distribution as patronage dividends.
The statutory language used in representative states concerning the final dis-
tribution of these remaining profits is as follows:
North Dakota:
Directors to Apportion Earnings: Dividends; Reserves; Patronage Dividends.... The
remainder of the net earnings shall be prorated by a dividend upon the amount of
purchases or sales of raw material or both of stockholders. .... I
Minnesota:
Net income in excess of dividends on capital stock and additions to reserve and surplus
shall be distributed on the basis of patronage.2
Illinois:
... net income in excess of additions to reserves and surplus so established, shall be dis-
tributed to the members of the association on the basis of patronage 3
Michigan:
The Michigan Cooperative Corporation Law discusses the provisions in by-laws
providing for patronage dividends by cooperative corporations organized thereunder:
Said by-laws shall further provide . . . in what manner, method and proportion the
surplus annual earnings and profits of the business of such corporation, in excess of such
dividends and reserve fund, shall be divided up and distributed as a cooperative divi-
dend, under the cooperative plan or principle... .4
IN. D. REV. CODE 510-1520 (1943).
NMirN. STAx. Ar;. §308.12.
'I.L. STAT. AxN. c. 30.46, §S5.
'The General Corporation Act, MICH. CoMp. LAws §10035, c. 195.
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New York:
Under the New York Cooperative Corporation Law5 the members of the cor-
poration may be divided into two classes. Members of the first class include com-
mon stockholders and may include employees. Members of the second class include
non-stockholder patrons for whom the corporation does business amounting to at
least $ioo during any fiscal year.8 The law deals with patronage dividends in Sec-
tion 93, which reads in part as follows:
Earnings; dividends.... The remainder of the net earnings, may in the discretion of
the directors be distributed by uniform dividend to members of the first class and members
of the second class.1
Florida:
... net income in excess of additions to reserves and surpluses so established, shall be
distributed to the members of the association on the basis of patronage. Any distribution
of reserves and surpluses at any time shall be made to members at the time such dis-
tribution is ordered on the basis of patronage.
Any receipts or dividends from subsidiary corporations or from stock or other se-
curities owned by the association shall be included in the ordinary receipts of the
association.8
Statutes from other states follow the same design.
It thus appears that patronage dividend rights are similar to the rights of
holders of an inferior grade of stock and are payable only out of the profits remain-
ing after the preferred and common shareholders have been paid their dividends.
In Minnesota, the Commissioner of Agriculture proposed the following question
to the Attorney General with respect to cooperative corporations:
Is it mandatory upon an association organized under Chapter 23, Laws of x921, to
pay a dividend on capital stock before a portion of the net earnings can be distributed
as patronage dividends?
The Attorney General answered the question as follows:
Yes. The law is not as clear as it might be in respect to this, but I think such
mandatory character is disclosed by the general provisions of the law.
From these, it appears that the intent was that capital stock should receive a dividend
before a patronage dividend should be declared, and I so hold.
The Commissioner also asked what would govern the rate of dividend to be
paid on the capital stock, and the Attorney General answered:
If the earnings are such as to justify them in declaring an eight per cent dividend, I
think it is the intent of the law that they should do so, and they cannot arbitrarily under
such circumstances declare a smaller dividend.9
IN. Y. Coop. Corn,. LAw. 61d. §85.
'Id §93, as amended by c. 383, Laws of 1932. $F" STAT. ANw. §618.15.
9xo9 Oss. Arr'y GEN. MIrN. 124 (92A.).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
It should be noted that the state laws do not direct cooperative corporations to
do business on a cost basis, or even to pay additional prices or give rebates which
would result in doing business on a cost basis. They direct the corporation to dis-
tribute its profits according to a certain pattern. When the corporation, in obedi-
ence to the law, distributes its profits in that fashion, it is, beyond question, making
a distribution of its profits and not making a price adjustment or rebate. This
holds true regardless of the name given to the corporate profits. Calling them
"net savings" does not change the fact that they are profits earned by the corporation.
If the cooperatives believed that they had no net earnings or net profits, and that
by means of rebates and price adjustments they did business on a cost basis, one
would expect their by-laws to reflect that fact. The by-laws could do so if that
were the way in which cooperatives did business; however, since they do business
at a profit, that is the fact reflected in their charters and by-laws.
For example, the by-laws of one cooperative corporation provided:
Profits shall be divided among stockholders as follows: Not to exceed 8 per cent on the
paid up capital and the balance of profits, if any, shall be divided among the members,
according to the amount of business they have transacted with the association, but first
not less than 5 per cent shall be added to the educational fund and io per cent to the
surplus.'o
The Farmers Cooperative Association case' involved a Kansas cooperative
corporation. An answer to the question whether its members received corporate
profits by way of patronage dividends may be found by reading Article X of its
corporate charter:
Article X-Net Profits. The net approximate profits of the business shall be paid
to the members of the association at the close of each year after having been prorated
on the amount of their purchases or sales, for, or by themselves or families during the
year.12
The above examples are enough to indicate the pattern which the charter pro-
visions and by-laws of cooperative corporations customarily follow.'8 They usually
provide, first of all, that a certain percentage of the net profits of the corporation
shall be used to set up surplus reserves; that thereafter dividends shall be paid on
capital stock; and finally that the remainder of the net profits shall be distributed
as patronage dividends.
II
The leaders of the cooperative movement maintain that cooperative corporations,
by means of patronage-dividend price adjustments, in effect do business at cost,
and that therefore, since they earn no profits, the question of taxing their profits
1
oARR 6967, M-i CuM. BU.L. 287 (1924). (Italics supplied.)
115 B.T.A. 6z (1926). " Id. at 62.
"
8 Similar charter provisions and by-laws of cooperative corporations may be found in the following
cases: Sacred Heart Cooperative Mercantile Co., 2 B.T.A. 24 (1925); Trego County Cooperative Ass'n,
6 B.T.A. 1275 (1927); Farmers Union Cooperative, 13 B.T.A. 969 (1928); Midland Cooperative Whole-
sale, 44 B.T.A. 824 (1941); Farmers Union Cooperative Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F. 2d 488 (C.C.A. 8th
1937); Cooperative Oil Ass'n v. Commissoner, 115 F. 2d 666 (C.C.A. 9th 1940).
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cannot arise. When the courts are faced with this issue, however, they are not
satisfied with the fact that a patronage dividend is superficially like a price adjust-
ment. They study the way in which the corporation operates and the way in
which the monies it distributes are earned.
In Storen v. Jasper City Farm Bureau Co-operative 1ssociation14 the cooperative
association claimed exemption from the state gross income tax. That the court re-
garded patronage dividends as distributions of income rather than as price adjust-
ments clearly appears from the following language taken from its opinion:
The profit or any gain made as a result of the carrying on of a business of buying
and selling has in recent years, under both federal and state net income tax acts, been
held to be income. The gain made here was made in the conduct of a purely com-
mercial business which consisted of making purchases and sales. The difference in the
cost of the appellee and its sales price to the purchaser was a profit, gain, or income
and thus inured to the ...patrons of appellee .... 15
In Schuster v. Ohio Farmers' Co-operative Milk Association- the cooperative
maintained that it did not engage in business for a profit. The circuit court of
appeals answered this argument as follows:
Obviously, the cooperative marketing association is organized for profit in the sense of
financial benefit to its members. The element of departure from ordinary corporate
economic practice is found in the fact that the financial gain is enjoyed by the members
in proportion to the production, by each, of the products handled, rather than in pro-
portion to the capital otherwise contributed by each to the conduct of the business; but
this difference of economic principle governing the distribution of wealth cannot alter
the fact that the sole incentive to membership in such an association is the financial
benefit to be derived therefrom in the marketing of the farm products which the member
is producing.17
Sometimes cooperative spokesmen contend that, even though the cooperative
corporation does make a profit, since it is a cooperative corporation as distinguished
from a capitalistic corporation its profits belong to its members and cannot be taxed
to it. This argument was used in Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
Lederer.j8 In holding that the mutual corporation was taxable on its profits, the
Supreme Court said:
The fact that the investment resulting in accumulation or dividend is made by a co-
operative as distinguished from a capitalistic concern does not prevent the amount thereof
being properly deemed a profit on the investment.' 9
In Farmers Oil Company v. State Tax Commission"° the plaintiff was a co-
Dperative company selling gasoline and fuel oils to its members, all of whom
is 103 Ind. App. 77, 2 N. E. 2d 432 (1936).
I d. at 434. (Italics supplied.) See also Diekmann v. Evansville Producers Commission Ass'n,
219 Ind. 636, 40 N. E. 2d 327 (1942).
16 6z F. 2d 337 (C.C.A. 6th 1932). "'Id. at 338. (Italics supplied.)
is252 U. S. 523 (1920).
1 d. at 534. See also Frost v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 278 U. S. 515 (1929), hold-
ing that a cooperative corporation is in business for profit.
2o41 N. M. 693, 73 P. 2d 8x6 (1937).
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operated farms and ranches. The corporation claimed that it had no profits and
merely assisted its members to obtain supplies at a low cost. In considering the
argument of the cooperative, the court noted that, while the business corporation
earns profit as an entity, the profit is destined to go to the stockholders in the form
of dividends. Similarly, the cooperative corporation earns profit as an entity and
distributes it to patrons. The court said:
The mere fact that plaintiff makes the volume of purchases from it by members,
rather than the number of shares owned, the measure of their gain in no wise alters the
fact that it, as well as its members, receives benefit and advantage in thus fulfilling the
very purpose of its corporate existence 21
If patronage dividends were, in fact, rebates or additional payment of price, the
tax consequences of paying them would in all cases be the same as if the adjusted
price had been the one originally paid. The courts, however, do not accept
this theory.
Further light on the nature of the patronage dividend can be found in its treat-
ment under the NIRA2 2 The NIRA and its codes was designed to stabilize prices
and to prohibit the various trade discounts, rebates, and price adjustments cus-
tomarily used in business.23 In as much as some Treasury rulings had loosely re-
ferred to patronage dividends as rebates, there was a question whether the NIRA
and its codes prohibited the payment of patronage dividends by a cooperative
corporation. Since legitimate cooperative corporations distribute actual earnings to
their patrons as patronage dividends and do not give them any rebates or price
adjustments, the President, on October 23, 1933, issued Executive Order No. 6 55,
in which he ordered:
... that no provision in any code of fair competition, agreement, or license which has
heretofore been or may hereafter be approved ...shall be so construed or applied as
to prohibit the payment of patronage dividends in accordance with law to any member
by any bona fide and legitimate cooperative organization, including any farmers' co-
operative, duly organized under the laws of any State, Territory or the District of
Columbia or of the United States, if such patronage dividends are paid out of actual
earnings of such cooperative organization and are not paid at the time when such
member makes a purchase from such cooperative organization. 4
It was of course possible for the cooperative corporations to give rebates to their
members as patronage dividends and thus violate the NIRA and its codes. The
Executive Order, however, made it clear that no rebate was being given and so no
code provision was being violated if a true patronage dividend, i.e., a distribution
of actual earnings, was made to the members of the corporation.
Just as the essential nature of the patronage dividend kept it from being classed
as a rebate and so prohibited under the provisions of the NIRA, so also did its
essential nature keep it from being regarded as a rebate prohibited under the
'Id. at 8M8. 2248 STAT. r95 (1933).
"Exzc. ORDER No. 6355, Oct. 23, 1933. (Italics supplied.)
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Robinson-Patman Act. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibited any rebates which had
the effect of lessening competition or creating a monopoly. 5 Patronage dividends
having that effect would be prohibited by the Act if they were in any sense trade
discounts, rebates, or price adjustments. However, the Robinson-Patman Act fur-
ther provides:
Nothing ... [in this Act] shall prevent a cooperative association from returning to its
members, producers or consumers the whole, or any part of, the net earnings or surplus
resulting from its trading operations, in proportion to their purchases or sales from, to,
or through the association 26
The United States Treasury Department recognizes that cooperative corporations
make profits. Its report on the taxation of farm cooperatives, issued in October,
1947, states:
A successfully operated farm cooperative will ordinarily produce some economic income
over a period of years, especially if it uses any significant amount of capital and assumes
any significant amount of risk.27
Whether the Treasury Department regards patronage dividends as rebates or
price adjustments or whether it regards them as distributions of corporate profits
(economic income) may be found from a Department ruling which concerned
an incorporated fruit growers' association'that conducted its business at a profit.
The Treasury Department ruled that this non-exempt corporation would not have
to pay any income tax on its patronage dividends. It authorized the corporation
to:
... deduct from gross income amounts periodically returned to members as a refund of
profits on business transacted with them and proportioned to the amount of such
business.26
The Treasury ruling does not say that cooperative corporations do business at
cost, or that because of price adjustments they have no net income. It does rule,
however, that when this net income is distributed to the patron-members of the
corporation as a patronage dividend, it will be permitted to escape the corporate
income tax.
The position of the Tax Court with respect to funds distributed as patronage
dividends may be determined from its language in United Cooperatives, Inc.,-'
decided in 1944. Referring to dividends on the cooperative's common stock, the
court said:
After a careful consideration of petitioner's charter and bylaws, we conclude that
petitioner's patrons were entitled as of right to a distribution of petitioner's net income
25 49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. 553(a) (1941).
36 49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. 513(b) (94) (Italics supplied.) Similar treatment was ac-
corded patronage dividends under the OPA. See pars. 4 and 5, subsection (c), S13o5.215, SUPPLE-
MENrAtY ORDER No. 84, 9 FaD. REG. 1721 (1944) and under the Commodity Exchange Act, 49 STAT.
1491 (1936), 7 U.S.C. § et seq. (1940).
"1U. S. Tx.sumxy D.WrT REP. 6 (October, 1947).
"*0. D. 64, 1 Cum. BULL. 208 (i919). (Italics supplied.)29 4 T.C. 93 (1944)-
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as defined by article VI of its bylaws as so-called patronage dividends without further
corporate action on petitioner's part, and that the corporate resolutions set out in our
findings merely recognized and confirmed the rights which the patrons already had, in
so far as they refer to the net income of petitioner available for distribution to its patrons
after the payment of dividends on petitioner's common stock....
These dividends, if paid, would be paid out of net income. If dividends were not paid,
then the net income of the petitioner available for distribution to its patrons would be
accordingly greater. The choice of whether so much of its net income as equaled 8%
of the par value of its common stock should be distributed to its stockholders as a
dividend or to its patrons as rebates was in the corporation.80
The Tax Court terms that which is available for distribution to patrons "net
income of the petitioner." This "net income" can be distributed to the stockholder-
patrons either on the basis of their stock holdings, or on the basis of their patronage,
or on the basis of both. No price adjustment is involved which would prevent the
corporation from having any income to distribute on the basis of patronage.
As a result of a long-established practice of the Treasury Department, patronage
dividends of cooperatives are, in the main, not taxed. This tax exemption has also
been sanctioned by the Board of Tax Appeals. There are also three or four more or
less conflicting opinions (not quite in point) at the circuit court of appeals level. 1
The question has never been before the Supreme Court.
An excellent example of how the Treasury practice is sanctioned by the Board
of Tax Appeals is found in the leading case of Midland Cooperative Wholesale v.
Commissioner. 2 That case involved a super-cooperative corporation, the members
of which were local cooperative associations. This super-cooperative operated gas-
oline service stations and sold automobile accessories and supplies. It was organ-
ized under the 1923 Minnesota Cooperative Law,8 which contained the following
provision regarding "Earnings, Reserves, and Patronage Dividends":
Net income in excess of dividends on capital stock and additions to reserve and
surplus shall be distributed or credited on the basis of the quantity or value of the com-
modities handled for each patron.34
In December, T937, the board of directors approved a resolution providing for
"the disposition of the net earnings for 1937." This resolution provided that 5o
per cent of the "net earnings" should be placed in a "Patrons' Equity Reserve."
The question before the Board of Tax Appeals was whether or not that part of
the net earnings which had been placed in the "Patrons' Equity Reserve" should be
subject to the corporate income tax. In approaching the problem, the Board first
slid. at 1o7, io8. (Italics supplied.)
'Farmers Union Coop. Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F. 2d 488 (C.C.A. 8th x937); Cooperative Oil
Ass'n v. Commissioner, x15 F. 2d 666 (C.C.A. 9th 1940); American Box Shook Export Ass'n v. Com-
missioner, z56 F. 2d 629 (C.CA. gth 1946); San Joaquin Valley Poultry Producers Assn v. Com-
missioner, 136 F. 2d 382 (C.C.A. gth 1943).
'44 B.T.A. 824 (1941).
*SLaws of 1923, c. 326, §7.
*A Ibd.
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noted that Congress had not provided for the deduction of patronage dividends
from the gross income of a cooperative association. It went on to say:
The Treasury Department, however, . . .with "great liberality" has allowed such
deductions "to the end that substantial justice may 15e done to an association which is
engaged in cooperative marketing or purchasing work but which may not be exempt
from taxation. ' 5
The Board therefore allowed the deduction.
In this case, Midland also sought credit for purposes of the surtax imposed
by Section 14 of the Revenue Act of 1936,86 because in accordance with the state
law under which it was organized, its corporate by-laws, and the resolution adopted
by its board of directors, it had distributed its net income to its stockholders and
patrons. The Board of Tax Appeals, however, refused to agree that it had thus
distributed its income and commented on the contention that it had done so as
follows:
It is also not inappropriate to point out that petitioner's contention that the "net income'
of a corporation is being "distributed," if- sustained, would deprive it of the deduction
of the amounts paid to its members or allocated to them upon its books; for such de-
ductions may be allowed only upon the theory that the distributions were rebates upon
the business of the members rather than income of the association.87
The Board of Tax Appeals exercised "great liberality" in order to permit this
income to escape the corporate income tax.
According to the courts, the only reason for not taxing patronage dividends at
the corporate level is that the corporation earns them under an obligation to dis-
tribute them to patrons. Patronage dividends paid in the absence of such an
obligation to distribute are considered part of the corporate net income and are
taxed to the corporation s8
In holding that patronage dividends not paid because of an obligation to dis-
tribute them are taxable at the corporate level, the courts use reasoning similar to
that used by the Tax Court in American Box Shook Export Association v. Com-
missioner,39 where the court said:
The taxpayer points to no statute authorizing the claimed deductions. Clearly they
are not deductible expenses. The petitioner was under no obligation to make distribu-
tions to its members until the board of directors had so acted. 40
On the other hand, when the corporation has by-laws or a charter directing
3' Supra note 32, at 830.
Be 53 STAT. 8 (1939), as amended, 26 U.S.C. §14 (1940).
17 Supra note 32, at 835.
SeFountain City Cooperative Creamery Ass'n, 9 T. C. No. 140 (x947); American Box Shook Ex-
port Ass'n v. Commissioner, 156 F. 2d 629 (C.C.A. 9th 1946); Druggists Supply Corporation, 8 T. C.
1343 (1947); Peoples Gin Co. v. Commissioner, xi8 F. 2d 72, af'g 41 B.T.A. 343 (C.C.A. 5th x941);
United Butchers Abattoir, Inc., 5 T.C.M. 40 (1946); Farmers Union Cooperative Elevator Ass'n, 4 T.C.M.
490 (945); Farmers Union State Exchange eta., 3o B.T.A. xo5 ('934); cf. Juneau Dairies, Inc.,
44 B.T.A. 759 (z941); Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d 130 (C.C.A. 3d 5943).
"4 T. C. 758 (1945).
"Id. at 763.
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the distribution of patronage dividends, the income so distributed is allowed to
escape taxation because it is paid in pursuance of a legal obligation.
The nature of the change from corporate net income into an exclusion or de-
duction from gross income is clearly shown in Peoples Gin Company v. Com-
missioner41 In this case, a business corporation incurred an obligation to pay pa-
tronage dividends after profits had been determined. Concerning this patronage
dividend, the Board said:
Such a distribution constitutes the payment of a dividend and is not deductible in de-
termining the petitioner's net income. The fact that the profits were distributed to
stockholders on some basis other than the stock held by each stockholder does not make
the distribution any the less a dividend. 42
Subsequently, the Peoples Gin Company made anticipatory by-laws and contracts
with respect to the income it expected to earn in the future. The effect of these
anticipatory contracts and by-laws was to assign its net income to its stockholders
in proportion to their patronage.
The Commissioner again attempted to tax the company's patronage dividends
at the corporate level. The Tax Court pointed out that the written agreements
entered into by the corporation obligated it to make the payments involved and
decided that it was therefore entitled to deduct them from its gross income.43
The point sharply presented is: Do profits distributed to stockholder-patrons,
admittedly non-deductible in the absence of a pre-existing obligation, become de-
ductible merely by virtue of the existence of such an obligation?
Cooperative leaders, since the case for the non-taxability of their corporate earn-
ings depends upon it, are forced to maintain that this question should be answered
in the affirmative, and it is true that the eddy in the law caused by the Tax Court's
acceptance of the "great liberality" of the Treasury Department supports their
position. When we get away from this great liberality, however, and examine the
principles of law which apply to the taxation of income, we find case after case
involving all types of factual situations in which the courts have held time and
time again that the existence of such an obligation does not prevent the profits from
being taxable to the person or corporation earning them. Persons and corporations
have frequently entered into anticipatory contracts and trust agreements governing
income to be earned in the future. When such income is earned and distributed
in accordance with the contractual obligation, a question arises whether it should
be taxed to the person or corporation earning it, to the person or corporation receiv-
ing it, or to both. Basically, the question is one of assigned income.
The leading case on this subject is Lucas v. Earl,4 in which Earl and his wife
agreed in 19oi that any profit that they might receive would be held by them as
joint tenants. The validity of the contract was not questioned; yet the Court held
41 B.T.A. 343 (1940).
,Id. at 347, 348.
"Peoples Gin Co., 2 T.C.M. 325 (1943).
"281 U. S. sIr (193o).
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that all of Earl's earnings were taxable solely to him, even though they were not all
beneficially received by him. Concerning the income tax, the Court said:
... the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however
skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the
man who earned it.45
The Court disregarded "the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a
different tree from that on which they grew."401
The principle of law involved is well set out in the following language from
Saenger v. Commissioner:47
The rule of the Earl Case, while made graphic by a figure, is more than a figure of
speech. It is an expression of the simple truth that earned incomes are taxed to and
must be paid by those who earn them, and unearned incomes to those who own the
property or right that produced them, not to those to whom their earners or owners are
under contract to pay them. It establishes once for all that no device or arrangement, be
it ever so shrewdly and cunningly contrived, can make future earnings taxable to any
but the real earner of them, can make future incomes from property taxable to any but
the owner of the right or title from which the income springs.48
In other words, when a cooperative corporation enters into marketing contracts
with its patrons, which provide that the profits of the corporation shall be distributed
to the patrons on the basis of their patronage, the earned incomes of that corporation
"are taxed to and must be paid by those who earn them and ... not to those to
whom their earners or owners are under contract to pay them."
A factual situation having much in common with that of marketing coopera-
tives existed in Fontana Power Company P. Commissioner."9 In that case, the
taxpayer, a public utility corporation, acquired certain operating properties in ex-
change for all of its stock and agreed to pay to the sellers, the difference between
the value of the stock it issued to them and the value of the properties it received,
the value to be determined later. Pending this determination, the taxpayer con-
tracted and was obligated to pay to the sellers all of its net profits. These profits,
received by the sellers, were regarded as part payment to them of the properties
sold, exactly as the patron-member of a marketing cooperative claims the corporate
profits he receives in patronage-dividend form are payment in part for the produce
he has previously sold to the corporation. The Board said:
Neither are we impressed by petitioner's argument that the payments involved here,
made by petitioner to its stockholders for so many years, cannot be considered as dis-
tributions in the nature of dividends because (i) they were made pursuant to a contract
and not pursuant to the rights of the payees as stockholders, and (2) the distributions
consisted of the net earnings and not the surplus profits technically available for
dividends.5 0
Id. at 115. lbid.
"69 F. 2d 631 (C.C.A. 5th 1934). 'I"d. at 632. (Italics supplied.)
"43 B.T.A. iogo (1941), a0'd, 127 F. 2d 193 (C.C.A. 9th 1942).
"Ild. at 1097. (Italics supplied.)
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Referring to the contractual-obligation argument of the taxpayer, the Board said:
The practical effect of the transactions was to distribute an amount equivalent to the
net profits of petitioner to its stockholders.51
The Board held for the Commissioner. The circuit court of appeals affirmed,52
holding that the corporate income was taxable to the corporation earning it, even
though it was distributed under a contractual obligation, because the petitioner
could point to no statute authorizing the deduction it sought. Thus the fact that
distributions are made pursuant to a contract 'and on a basis of patronage rather
than the rights of the payees as stockholders should have no effect on the obliga-
tion of the corporation to pay an income tax on the profits it distributes in accordance
with its contractual obligations.
Similar reasoning was followed by the circuit court of appeals in Cooperative
Oil Association v. Commissioner.53 In that case the Commissioner, instead of fol-
lowing the long-established bureau practice, sought to tax at the corporate level
cooperative net income, the distribution of which as patronage dividends was tem-
porarily postponed to provide the corporation with working capital. The coopera-
tive had been incorporated as a non-profit cooperative association under the laws
of Ohio."4 The by-laws of the corporation provided that its net income, except such
amounts as by law or by the Board of Directors might be set aside as reserve funds,
should be distributed to the stockholding patrons on the basis of their patronage.
Before the court, the cooperative contended that its articles and by-laws specifically
made its earnings belong to its members so that it did not earn profits for itself as
a taxable entity but only for its members. Outside of the administrative practice of
the Treasury Department, the court could find no provision in the statute which
would allow patronage dividends to escape taxation. Answering the contentions
of the cooperative and ruling in favor of the Commissioner, the court said:
In other words, petitioner points to no statute authorizing any deduction whatever,
and we are in effect asked to hold that a practice of respondent permitting a deduction
not authorized by statute, is not liberal enough. We know of no manner in which such
liberality may be reviewed in this cour... Whether respondent should have allowed
the deduction he did allow is a question upon which we express no opinion.55
Since no issue was before the court with respect to the deduction allowed by the
Commissioner for income actually distributed as patronage dividends, it would
have been improper for the court to point out that its reasoning was equally ap-
plicable to the deduction allowed with respect to such funds. Surely cooperatives
seeking to escape income taxes on that part of their income distributed as patronage
'ibid.
"gSee note 49 supra
=xr5 F. 2d 666 (C.C.A. 9th 1940).
"The Ohio Code relating to such associations provided: "Associations organized hereunder shall
be deemed 'non-profit' inasmuch as they are not organized to make profits for themselves, as such,
or for their members, as such, but only for their members as producers." Omo GEN. CoDa ANN.
Szox86.x.
" 15 F. 2d 666, 668, 669 (C.C.A. 9th 1940). (Italics supplied.)
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dividends should also be required to point to an applicable statute and show that
they come within its terms. But, since Congress did not authorize a deduction for
income distributed as patronage dividends, cooperatives are forced to rely solely
upon the great liberality of the Treasury Department and the acceptance of that
liberality by the Tax Court. In fact, as a matter of law, it is difficult to see why the
net income of a non-exempt cooperative corporation is not subject to the corporate
income tax, even though some or all of it is distributed to its stockholding patrons
in the form of patronage dividends.
In Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. United States," the Supreme Court said:
Income is not any the less taxable income of the taxpayer because by his command it is
paid directly to another in performance of the taxpayer's obligation to that other.57
It follows that if patronage dividends are paid from the income of a cooperative
corporation in order to comply with its charter or by-laws, and in order to settle
an obligation of the cooperative to its patrons, then the patronage dividends should
be taxable to the cooperative corporation.
Balkwill v. Commissioner s dealt with the taxability of income from a part-
nership interest which had been placed in trust. In applying the principle under
consideration the court said:
... the person who receives income is not relieved from the tax because he chooses not
to enjoy it; and this, is not necessarily changed by the fact that he is deprived of the
income by a legal obligation.59
Comer v. Davis60 concerned a trust agreement and the distribution of future
earnings thereunder. The Commissioner disregarded the contractual obligations
involved and taxed the trustees on the money they earned whether they had a
right to retain it or not. In sustaining the position of the Commissioner, the court
said:
It is well established that earned income is taxable to those who earn it, notwith-
standing a contractual disposition after it is received. The statute here involved so levies
the tax, and to question appellant's liability therefor is not so much a matter of statu-
tory construction as a challenge to the power of Congress to levy the tax against the
person who owns the income.61
The Board of Tax Appeals has also disregarded the contractual-obligation theory
without hesitation when an ordinary business corporation was involved. 2
Porter Royalty Pool, Inc. v. Commissioner6 s concerned a corporation which, like
a cooperative corporation, had a by-law that required it to make a distribution of
its income. In trying to avoid the payment of income taxes upon the income dis-
tributed in accordance with its contractual obligations, the corporation used the
6"296 U. S. 6o (1935). 11 Id. at 64. (Italics supplied.)
te 77 F. 2d 569 (C.C.A. 6th 1935), rert. denied, 296 U. S. 609 (1935).
"Id. at 570. (Italics supplied.) so 107 F. 2d 355 (C.C.A. 5th 1939).
"I d. at 357. (Italics supplied.)
"'Maine Central Transportation Co., 42 B.T.A. 350 (1940).$7 T. C. 685 (1946).
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same arguments that cooperative corporations use to justify their escape from a
similar tax liability. The corporation's arguments are set out in the opinion as
follows:
... the petitioner contends that the sums in question were not its income but were the
income of its stockholders. It contends that under its articles of incorporation and
by-laws the petitioner was empowered only to collect the royalties and was required to
distribute them monthly to the stockholders after deducting expenses and the sum of
$200 which was required to be retained in the treasury; that it could use the royalties
for no purposes of its own; could not engage in business; and that, therefore, it had no
proprietary right, title, or interest to the moneys received but received them only as
trustees or agents for its stockholders.64
The Tax Court refused to be swayed by the above arguments and, holding the
corporation to be taxable on the income it was obligated to distribute, referred to
Moline Properties v. Commissioner.6 5 There the Supreme Court referred in the
following language to Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Company,6 where
a corporation had been held taxable for a profit on a sale to its sole stockholder:
This was because the taxpayer had adopted the corporate form for purposes of his own.
The choice of the advantages of incorporation to do business, it was held, required the
acceptance of the tax disadvantages. 67
The members of an incorporated cooperative association have chosen to use the
corporate form of doing business. The fact that by contractual arrangements the
corporate income goes not to the corporation but to its patron-stockholders is irrele-
vant as far as the taxation of that income to the corporate entity is concerned. When
the corporate members accept the advantages of incorporation, they are also re-
quired to accept the tax disadvantages.
The mere fact that the cooperative purports to act as agent for its members does
,dot warrant its tax exemption. A corporation can transfer its earnings in only
two ways: by gift and by contract. Neither of these transfers will affect the in-
come-tax liability of the corporation on the earnings so transferred. When a cor-
poration uses its own business judgment in its business operations it is acting as a
principal and is taxed as a principal even though it does not treat its earnings as
its own because it is acting under an agency contract.68
Cooperatives also argue that the part of their net income which they are obli-
gated to distribute as patronage dividends cannot be taxed to them because they
have no control over such funds. They direct attention to the fact that they are
bound by charter provisions or by by-laws which they have previously adopted
and so do not have free control over the disposition of their income.
An example showing how little control is necessary to make income taxable to
the former owner is found in United States v. Joliet & Chicago Railroad Com-
" Id. at 697. :5319 U. S. 436 (1943).
"287 U. S. 415 (1932). 7319 U. S. 436, 439 (1943).
"All Russian Textile Syndicate v. Conmissioner, 62 F. 2d 614 (C.C.A. 2d r933), cerl. denied,
289 U. S. 752 (1933).
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pany.69 The plaintiff in that case, the owner of thirty-seven miles of railroad be-
tween the cities of Joliet and Chicago, Illinois, on January i, 1864, entered into
an indenture under which it granted, demised, and leased the railroad, together
with all the appurtenances thereof, to the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, its
successors and assignees, without reservation, forever. In consideration therefor, the
Chicago & Alton Railroad Company obligated itself to pay to the plaintiffs stock-
holders forever, in quarterly installments, an annual dividend of 7 per cent per
share on the par value of all outstanding capital stock.
Although the plaintiff corporation remained in existence only to maintain a
stock-transfer book, the Commissioner asserted a tax against it on the basis that
the income received by its stockholders was income to it. The taxpayer pointed
out that the so-called lease in perpetuity without a defeasance clause divested it of
all right, title, and interest in the property and vested a full and indefeasible title in
the grantee. The taxpayer also called attention to the fact that the indenture of
1864 vested all rights to payment of dividends in its stockholders and divested it of
any right to, or control over, such payments. The taxpayer therefore contended
"that a corporation which does not own or control property and has no right to,
or control over, any income from the property cannot be in receipt of income, con-
structively or otherwise."70 In sustaining the Commissioner, the Court said:
Such considerations do not dispose of this controversy .... The fact that there is an
anticipatory arrangement whereby the taxpayer is not even a conduit of the payments
is no more significant in this type of case than it was in Lucas v. Earl, supra.7'
In a footnote to Commissioner v. Tower,72 the Supreme Court referred to the
Joliet & Chicago Railroad case, saying:
Under some circumstances, income has been held taxable to a person even when he
does not own or control it.73
The fact that a cooperative corporation has no immediate right to or control
over the income which it distributes as a refund to its patrons does not mean,
therefore, that it should escape the corporate income tax with respect to such
monies.
III
The above review of cooperative statutes, charters, by-laws, Treasury rulings,
and court decisions demonstrates that "patronage dividends," as that term is com-
monly used by the cooperatives, are distributions of net income on a patronage
basis. Various principles of income tax law, when applied to cooperative cor-
porations, also indicate that patronage dividends should be included in their tax-
able income.
The cooperatives maintain that patronage dividends are additional price adjust-
ments, or rebates, or price payments, in order to justify their escape from taxation.
69315 U. S. 44 (1942). 1'1d. at 46.
T id. at 46, 48. (Italics supplied.) 7 327 U. S. 280 (1946).
"I1d. at 289 n. 7 (Italics supplied.)
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It is true that any money received from a business because of patronage may
superficially be regarded as a price adjustment. When that so-called "price adjust-
ment" is keyed to, and acts to distribute corporate profits, however, it must be con-
sidered as corporate net income for purposes of income taxation.
The cooperatives contend that they handle a patron's business on a non-profit
agency basis. Because of the large size of their operations, however, they do not
and cannot operate that way. Inherent difficulties make it economically unwise,
if not impossible, for them to act as agents, or to foresee economic conditions ac-
curately enough to enable them to operate on a cost basis. As a result, they have
to operate on a profit basis in the same way that any other business. corporation
does. Thus cooperative practice fails to follow cooperative theory. The coopera-
tives try to get back to the non-profit basis by the method in which they distribute
their taxable income. Since the substituted method is not the original ideal, however,
they do earn profits and so should be taxed on them. Moreover, the patronage
dividend paid to any particular member has no relation to the profits made on
transactions with him, and thus can be regarded only as a pro rata distribution of
over-all profits.
The cooperative does not act as the true agent of any particular patron. When
a patron makes a sale of commodities to the cooperative or a purchase of goods
from it, title to such commodities or goods passes to the purchaser upon execution
of the sale in both instances. After a marketing cooperative purchases the com-
modities, acquiring title thereto, it treats the commodities as its own, commingling
such commodities with those of others, mixing, processing, handling, and in some
cases manufacturing them without any requirement that an individual accounting
be made to each patron for each particular commodity" handled. In many cases,
incidental services are also performed. Because of the natural uncertainties of
business, losses may occur in some commodities and gains in others. With respect
to transactions with a particular patron, losses may occur on some or all transactions,
while with another patron the transactions may be consistently profitable.
In the case of purchasing or consumers' cooperatives, usual business practices are
followed with respect to accumulation of inventory. Market prices are determined
by reference both to general marketing conditions and cost of inventory acquisition.
As in the case of marketing cooperatives, numerous incidental services are performed.
A general analysis of the business operations of cooperatives reveals the im-
practicability if not the impossibility of relating patronage dividends to gain or
loss upon any particular transaction with any particular patron.
To say, in effect, that a sale remains open until the end of an accounting period
to permit the payment of an addition to the price does not recognize facts. For
example, during X946 there were extremely wide fluctuations in the price of flaxseed,
the price increasing from $3.00 to $6.oo per bushel in just a few days. Many farmers
sold flaxseed to cooperative grain elevators both before and after the price increase.
In the case of a farmer who before the price increase sold flaxseed which the co-
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operative sold after the price increase, the theory that the former sale was not
closed but was in fact open pending receipt of the additional price would require
that an additional payment of almost $3.00 per bushel be made. The farmer who
had received $6.oo initially and whose flaxseed was sold by the cooperative at $6.oo
plus freight and margin would not be entitled to receive additional payment. But
cooperative corporations do not return to each farmer the net proceeds of the
sales of his produce less necessary expenses; instead, they determine the over-all net
profits for flaxseed and these profits are shared by all flaxseed patrons in propor-
tion to their patronage.
The fact that cooperatives do not, by patronage dividends, adjust their prices
so as to do business at cost is dearly seen in the case where transactions with a
particular patron result in a loss. Assume, for example, that one patron sold only
durum wheat to the cooperative, all of which was disposed of at a loss. The greater
the patronage of this member, the greater is the cooperative's loss on his business,
and paradoxically, the greater is his share in the cooperative's over-all net profit.
The fact that a patronage dividend is not a mere price adjustment which enables
a cooperative to handle specific business transactions at cost is thrown into sharp
relief where the patronage dividend is more than the commission originally charged.
For example, the Eighth Annual Report of the Farmers Union Grain Terminal
Association states:
You will note that your patronage savings from FUGTA are more than the commission
rate which we must charge. This means the producer not only gets a patronage refund
equal to the full commission charged but also a fraction of a cent a bushel in addition.
The additional savings were made possible by the processing, storing and merchandising
of your grain through the terminal facilities.
This excerpt discloses that the Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association did
not merely handle the farmers' produce at cost. The size of its patronage dividend
was so large that, in effect, this cooperative not only handled the farmers' produce
for nothing but apparently paid him for putting it to the trouble of marketing his
produce.
Actually, of course, no price adjustment bringing services down to a cost basis
was involved. A patronage "saving" that saves more than it started with is patently
more than a "saving." There must have been income to pay for operating expenses
and to provide for the payment made to patrons in addition to the return of the
commission charged. In fact, the cooperative has simply distributed over-all profits,
and in so far as the price-adjustment theory holds otherwise it is unrealistic.
A consumers' cooperative during its fiscal year sells myriads of different kinds of
articles to members and non-members indiscriminately at varying profit margins-
some at a loss. A particular patron during the year may buy varying quantities of
many different items, from soap, cosmetics, tooth paste, drugs, electrical appliances,
corn flakes, and cigarettes to tractors, hay ricks, pumps, rope, and fence wire--each
at a different profit margin to the cooperative. He may confine his purchases to
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the grocery department, which shows an over-all loss, and be entitled to a patronage
dividend only because of large profits in the farm-machinery department. It is
obvious that what the member receives at the end of the year is not the profit that
the cooperative made on its transactions with him, but a share, fixed in a wholly
arbitrary and completely unrealistic fashion, of the cooperative's total yearly profits,
including its profits from collateral sources.
A further example will illustrate the true nature of the patronage dividend. A
cooperative may maintain branches in town A and town B. Because of inefficient
management or lack of sufficient volume at town B a net loss for the year may be
incurred by the branch there, while a profit may be realized at the branch in town
A. The patronage dividend paid to members dealing with the branch in town B
represents nothing but a shifting to them of profits on transactions with an entirely
different set of customers in town A. It is thus an absurdity to call the patronage
dividend paid to the members in town B an adjustment to the price of produce
already handled by that branch at a loss.
Cooperative spokesmen apparently have believed that if they could describe
patronage dividends as being a kind of price adjustment (i.e., an additional or final
payment to the farmer for his produce; or, in the case of purchases, the return of
excess charges made over actual cost to the cooperative) they would have justified
the escape of patronage dividends from corporate income taxes.
Analysis of this theory shows that such is not the case. A patronage dividend
can be a final payment to the farmer for his produce or the return to him of excess
charges over the cost of supplies purchased by him and still be distribution of cor-
porate income.
This fact has been particularly recognized by Treasury rulings and by the
courts in those cases in which cooperative corporations, doing business with members
and non-members, pay patronage dividends to members only. In those cases, the
cooperative corporation makes its final payment to the farmer for his produce, or
returns to him overcharges made on supplies furnished to all in accordance with
good cooperative theory, and yet those "price adjustments" are considered as dis-
tributing, in part at least, corporate income on which the cooperative must pay
a tax.
Thus a Treasury ruling states:
Profits made by the company upon sales to nonmembers constitute taxable income,
irrespective of the fact that such profits were returned to members by reduction of cost
or otherwise.7 4
In this ruling, the Treasury held that a reduction of cost (price adjustment) was
in essence a distribution of profits because the amount thereof was determined by
the net profits. Since "price adjustments" may be used to siphon net profits out of
the corporate entity, they are examined with great care and should be disallowed
"S.M. 2595, 11-2 CuM. Buu... 238 (1924). (Italics supplied.)
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for income-tax purposes when they are based upon, and in effect distribute, cor-
porate profits.
The courts in other similar situations have also refused to be bound by the
price adjustment theory, and have investigated the source of the funds distributed
as patronage dividends in order to determine whether or not the so-called "price
adjustment" was also a profit distribution made on a basis of patronage.
In Juneau Dairies, Inc. v. Commissioner,75 the Board of Tax Appeals under
such circumstances refused to allow the price-adjustment theory to decrease corporate
income taxes. With respect to the contracts controlling the price adjustments or
refunds, the Board pointed out that:
The contracts were made by the shareholders with an entity of their creation, an organi-
zation operated and controlled by them.76
Since it was the owners of the cooperative who were receiving the price adjust-
ment, the Board of Tax Appeals considered the funds distributed as a price ad-
justment to be a dividend, pointing out that:
... a distribution of profits may be made on a basis other than stockholdings and still
be a dividend distribution. 77
In other words, profits may be distributed as a final payment made for produce
furnished by a patron, and still be a distribution of profits on which the corporation
must pay a tax.
In Fruit Growers' Supply Company v. Commissioner78 a cooperative paid pa-
tronage dividends only to members although it also did business with non-members.
The cooperative maintained that a patronage dividend was a price adjustment on
members' produce and that when it computed its income, using the adjusted price,
it had little, if any, income earned as a result of its transactions. The court refused
to allow these "price adjustments" to decrease the income-tax liability of the cor-
poration on the profits distributed thereby. Referring to the income from non-
member business, the court said:
The fact that under the terms of its organization and its method of conducting business
this income would go to its members in proportion to the amount of goods purchased
by them instead of in proportion to the stock held by them, does not alter the fact that
the amount received is in the nature of a profit and therefore, income, to be distributed
in accordance with the form of organization of the corporation.... We cannot believe
that the method by which this income is distributed to the members detracts in anywise
from the fact that the profit is essentially an income to the corporation, and we believe,
and hold, that the Board of Tax Appeals correctly determined this question.79
While the distinction between a patronage dividend and a price adjustment was
recognized, it was not carried to its logical and reasonable conclusion. If it were,
there would be no issue today as to treatment of patronage dividends.
TB44 B.T.A 759 (1941). T'ld. at 762.
IId. at 763. To 56 F. 2d 90 (C.C-A- gth 1932).
To Id. at 92, 93.
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This can be illustrated by assuming a case in which a patron-member of a co-
operative limits his purchases during the year to "loss leaders." On each of his
purchases, as well as on all of his purchases in the aggregate during the year, the
cooperative will actually suffer a loss. Yet the patron will be entitled to a patronage
dividend, which can be paid to him only out of profits which the cooperative makes
on its transactions with other patrons. The difference in treatment between a
distribution to him of profits made on transactions with other members and a dis-
tribution to him of profits made on transactions with non-members is wholly irra-
tional, for there is no difference in principle.
Taxation is an intensely practical matter. Since it is concerned with economic
realities, these should be examined. The business operations of a cooperative cor-
poration are similar to those of a proprietary or business corporation. Although
organized for cooperative purposes, a cooperative is a separate legal entity, distinct
from its members and shareholders. The business corporation operates through
the agency of its paid officers and employees; the cooperative corporation operates
in the same way. The business corporation has capital stock divided into shares;
so has the ordinary cooperative. As opposed to partnerships, both business and co-
operative corporations have a continued existence which is not affected by the
death, bankruptcy, or personal conduct of members.
The profit of a business corporation is arrived at by finding the margin of
gross receipts over necessary costs and expenses. The cooperative's profits or savings
are arrived at in precisely the same way. In both, the net income or savings is
money surplus, and the profits will depend on market conditions, working capital,
and the loyalty and diligence of officers and employees. In neither type of organiza-
tion are the members or shareholders liable for the debts of the corporation except
to the extent of the amounts unpaid on their memberships or shares. In neither
is the individual member or shareholder entitled to the surplus or reserve, or any
part thereof, until the directors have declared a dividend in accordance with the
state law and the charter and by-laws of the corporation.
When comparisons are made, it is clear that cooperative corporations possess all
of the essential attributes of ordinary business corporations except as to the basis
of distribution of their net earnings. The business corporation usually divides
part of its profits among its shareholders in proportion to the shares owned. A
cooperative corporation, after distributing part of its profits to its shareholders in
the form of a dividend not exceeding 8 per cent, distributes the rest in proportion
to the volume of the members' purchases or sales.
The cooperative corporation has full command of its profits. As stated by the
circuit court of appeals in Farmers Union Co-op. Company v. Commissioner:80
Clearly this money is property of the corporation as genuinely and truly as is the grain
elevator or the stock of merchandise owned by it. While those who might be entitled to
patronage dividends have, in a sense, an interest in the money it is a character of interest
not greater, if as great, as that of a stockholder in an ordinary corporation. 8
8090 F. 2d 488 (C.C.A. 8th 1937). 8'1d. at 491.
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The court pointed out that this cooperative had the standard provisions in its
by-laws with respect to the payment of dividends upon capital stock, and held that
this was a feature of private profit from the enterprise. It concluded:
Such being the situation here, we must conclude that this balance of income over outgo in
1928 was a gain subject to taxation under the Sixteenth Amendment.82
These considerations point inevitably to the conclusion that the patronage divi-
dends distributed by a cooperative corporation are in the usual case distributions
of corporate income which only superficially resemble refunds or additional price
payments. This conclusion is founded on reasoning as well as on legislative, judi-
cial, and administrative authority. Since patronage dividends are distributions of
corporate profits, they should not escape corporate income taxes. Because of the
keen competition between corporations in our business economy, the power of
cooperative corporations to dodge payment of income taxes on all or a part of their
income gives them, in this era of high taxation, a tremendous competitive ad-
vantage-an advantage which, unless checked, threatens the very existence of
regular tax-paying corporations.
"Id at 492.
